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We propose a model of delegated portfolio management with career concerns. Investors hire fund
managers to invest their capital either in risky bonds or in riskless assets. Some managers have
superior information on the default probability. Looking at the past performance, investors update
beliefs on their managers and make ﬁring decisions. This leads to career concerns which aﬀect
investment decisions, generating a positive or negative “reputational premium”. For example, when
the default probability is high, the return on the risky bond has to be high to compensate the
uninformed managers for the high risk of being ﬁred. As the default probability changes over time,
the reputational premium ampliﬁes price volatility.
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The ￿nancial turmoil that began in the summer of 2007 and exploded in 2008 has fueled
debate on asset price volatility and the role of ￿nancial intermediaries and their incentives. In
the few years before the crisis, a number of market observers were concerned about a growing
￿overenthusiasm￿for risky investments in debt instruments, including high-yield corporate
bonds, mortgage-backed assets and emerging market bonds. Some connected these events
to the role of incentives of ￿nancial intermediaries. For example, one observer comments on
the bond ￿nanced leveraged buy-out boom in 2005:
The head of one of the biggest commercial lenders in the US describes the amount
of leverage on some buy-out deals as ￿nutty￿ . Much of the wildest lending is being
done by hedge funds awash with cash, he says. ￿Some funds believe they have to invest
the money even if it￿ s not a smart investment. They think the people that gave them
the money expect them to invest it. But it￿ s madness.￿(March 14, 2005, Financial
Times)
In this paper, we propose a general equilibrium model of portfolio management where
fund managers have career concerns. We show that managers￿career concerns distort their
investment decisions and magnify asset price volatility.
Figure 1 shows the pattern of the yield spreads of a sample of emerging market bonds, the
AAA and the B-graded corporate bonds, and the BB-graded commercial mortgage-backed
assets, between October 1994 and April 2010. The ￿gure shows at least two periods in which
all spreads shrunk to very low levels, close to the AAA corporate spreads: in 1996-1997 and
then again from 2005 to the summer of 2007. Observers describe these periods as periods
of overenthusiasm, which typically occur right before the emergence of a crisis (e.g. Kamin
and von Kleist, 1999, Du¢ e et al., 2003). The ￿gure also shows at least four episodes of
high turbulence in which the spreads of many high-risk bonds jump up and capital tends
to ￿ ow out of these markets, a phenomenon dubbed as ￿ ight-to-liquidity or ￿ ight-to-quality.
Our model is able to rationalize both episodes of apparent overenthusiasm and episodes of
￿ ight-to-liquidity.
We propose a model where investors delegate their portfolio decision to risk-neutral fund
managers. We assume that fund managers can invest either in risk-less assets or in risky
bonds. The default probability is an iid random variable and managers di⁄er in the degree
of information about its realization. We consider an extreme environment, where some
informed managers can perfectly predict the default state, while other uninformed managers
only know the realization of the default probability. The core of our model builds on the
2Figure 1: The JPMorgan EMBI+ spread for Asia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Mexico, Peru, the yield
spread of AAA corporate bonds and an index of the yield spread of B-graded corporate
bonds and BB-graded comercial mortgage-backed assets (with scale on the right side of the
￿gure) between October 1994 and April 2010. Source: Datastream, St. Louis Fed.
career concerns of the uninformed fund managers. Every period, each investor has a manager
working for him. At the end of the period, the investor updates his belief based on his
manager￿ s performance, and decides whether to retain him or to hire a new one. The
investors￿￿ring decision distorts the investment decision of uninformed managers who would
like to be perceived as informed.
One of our main results is that managers￿career concerns impose a premium on the
return of risky bonds, which may be positive or negative depending on the default probability.
Uninformed fund managers try to time the market in order to behave as if they were informed
and knew in advance if there was default or not. Default hurts the reputation of uninformed
managers who invest in the risky bond, and no default hurts the reputation of uninformed
managers who invest in the riskless asset. Thus, when the default risk is high, the premium
for investing in the risky bond is positive to compensate for the risk of being ￿red. When
instead the default risk is low, the risky bond will trade at a negative premium. This
3reputational premium ampli￿es the bond price volatility, in comparison to an economy with
no career concerns.
We also explore a more general version of the model, where we allow for persistent
default risk. In this case, career concerns have additional e⁄ects on asset price volatility.
In particular, the reputational premium now varies not only with the default probability
but also with the measure of employed managers who are informed, which is not stationary
anymore. The more employed managers are informed, the higher is the informational content
of future prices, which increase the expected utility of employed uninformed managers. This
makes reputation more valuable and increases the distorting e⁄ect of career concerns. This
implies that asset price movements cannot be explained purely by fundamentals. When the
measure of informed managers is in￿nitesimal, we show that a higher degree of persistence
dampens the reputational discount when the default risk is low and magni￿es the reputational
premium when the default risk is high.
It is well known that the premium on risky assets is time-varying: the di⁄erence between
the expected return on risky asset and riskless return is lower in good times than in bad times.
The more common explanations appeal to time-varying marginal utility of consumption
due to habit formation, time-varying probability of disasters or slow-moving component in
consumption risk.1 In our model the premium changes, because of the time-varying risk for a
manager of being ￿red. In contrast to the consumption-based explanations, our mechanism
implies that in good times (low risk) some managers are willing to take risky bets for returns
that do not compensate them enough for the risk.
Our mechanism is consistent with several empirical observations in di⁄erent markets.
For example, Coval, Jurek and Sta⁄ord (2008) argue that between 2004 and September
of 2007 collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) provided too little compensation for risk
compared to portfolios of securities of the same pay-o⁄ structure. As CDOs are traded only
by institutional investors, our mechanism is a good candidate to explain this phenomenon.
On a similar line, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) argue that hedge funds were investing
heavily in technological stocks during the dotcom bubble, although they seemed aware of the
mispricing. Our model suggests that hedge funds were willing to buy technological stocks
at highly in￿ ated prices because of their fear of losing reputation and hence funds if they
missed the high returns generated by the bubble. This is consistent with the additional fact,
reported in Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), that the largest hedge fund, Tiger Fund, which
refused to invest in technology stocks, experienced severe fund out￿ ows in 1999 compared
to its main competitor who did invest in technology stocks, Quantum Fund.
1See Cochrane (2006) for a detailed review.
4Finally, Du¢ e et al. (2003) document that the implied short spread of Russian bonds
was spectacularly low during the ￿rst 10 months of 1997. Moreover, their estimation shows
that in one short interval in 1997, bond prices were so high that the implied risk-neutral
default-adjusted short spread was negative. Although this implication relies heavily on their
speci￿c term structure model, it is worthwhile to point out that this is inconsistent with
most established explanations of time-varying premium, but consistent with our model.
Literature review. To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst paper to show that fund man-
agers￿career concerns amplify the reaction of asset prices to shocks, generating a counter-
cyclical premium.
Our paper is related to herding models, such as Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Zwiebel
(1995), and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006). These papers are close to our work because
agents with career concerns distort their decisions to convince their clients that they are
informed. However, our mechanism does not feature herding behavior. In these papers,
each agent herds on others￿decisions because going against the average action is a bad
signal about his ability. In our model, at the equilibrium prices, fund managers make their
investment decisions regardless of other managers￿decision. That is, there are no strategic
complementarities. Moreover, this literature typically concentrates on partial equilibrium
models while our focus is on the interaction of career concerns and asset prices. An exception
is Rajan (1994), which is very close to our spirit. Rajan (1994) shows that herding may
motivate bank executives to overextend credit in good times, hence amplifying the e⁄ect
of real shocks. However, in bad times banks provide the right amount of credit and there
is no ampli￿cation e⁄ect. In contrast, in our paper career concerns always generate an
ampli￿cation e⁄ect, given that when the default risk is high (bad times) managers are worried
of being ￿red and underinvest in the risky bonds.
There is also a growing literature which analyzes the e⁄ect of delegated portfolio manage-
ment on asset prices, such as Allen and Gorton (1993), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Vayanos
(2003), He and Krishnamurthy (2008), and Cuoco and Kaniel (2010). However, these papers
take managers￿distorted incentives as given. In particular, the two papers mainly related to
ours are Dasgupta and Prat (2008) and Dasgupta, Prat and Verardo (2008) who introduce
reputational concerns into a Glosten-Milgrom type of sequential trading model.2 They show
that reputational concerns can lead to excessive trading, slow revelation of information and
(if the market maker has market power) biased prices. They are the ￿rst to use the term
reputational premium and to point out that reputation may lead managers to choose bets
2More recently, Vayanos and Woolley (2008) show that learning about managerial ability can explain mo-
mentum and reversal, while Malliaris and Yan (2010) connect reputational concerns of hedge fund managers
to the skewness of their returns and slow moving capital.
5with negative net present value. However, both these papers take the reputational concerns
as exogenously given and the mechanism behind the reputational premium is based on herd-
ing behavior. Also, they do not explore the e⁄ect of reputation on asset price volatility,
which is the focus of our paper. Dasgupta and Prat (2006) is the ￿rst paper to microfound
reputational concerns of fund managers who are afraid to be ￿red. However, the mechanism
is again based on herding and the paper does not explore asset price volatility.
Our paper is also related to a large literature on the propagation and ampli￿cation of
fundamental shocks due to the interaction between asset values and collateralized lending.
Seminal papers in this area are Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
and Gromb and Vayanos (2002)3. The main di⁄erence with our mechanism is that these
papers have typically an asymmetric distortion, given that collateral constraints build into
the model an external ￿nance premium, usually generating underinvestment. In our model,
instead, we microfound the ￿nancial distortion and we generate a premium that can be either
positive or negative.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce an example
to illustrate the main mechanism of our model. In Section 3, we describe the model, and
de￿ne and characterize an equilibrium. In Section 4, we analyze an extended version of the
model, where the supply of risky bonds and the default decision are endogenous. In Section
5, we analyze an economy where productivity is persistent and we propose some numerical
exercises. Finally, Section 6 concludes. The Appendix includes all the proofs which are not
in the text.
2 An Example
In this section, we introduce a simple example to show the main mechanism of the model,
that is, how prices may be distorted by career concerns of fund managers.
Assume that a large group of risk-neutral fund managers have to decide whether to invest
a unit of capital in a risky asset or in a riskless asset. The risky asset has price p and pays
1 if the good state realizes and 0 if the bad state realizes. The probability of the bad state
is equal to q. The riskless asset pays the safe return R < 1=p. The riskless asset is in
in￿nite supply, while the supply of the risky bond is ￿xed and smaller than the total capital
invested by the managers. Assume that managers get a fraction ￿ of the investment returns
and obtain a constant reward W if and only if their investment is successful, that is, if
3See also Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999), Rampini (2004), Krishnamurthy (2003), Danielsson, Shin
and Zigrand (2004), Morris and Shin (2004), Bernardo and Welch (2004), Gai, Kondor and Vause (2005),
and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2009).
6they invest in the risky bond if and only if there is no default. This reward scheme may be
interpreted as the reduced form of a model where unsuccessful managers are ￿red and W
represents the value of being retained.
It is straightforward that the bond market clears if and only if managers are indi⁄erent
between investing in the risky bond and in the riskless asset. Hence, the equilibrium price
of the risky bond has to satisfy the following indi⁄erence condition:
(1 ￿ q)(￿=p + W) = ￿R + qW: (1)
The left-hand side of equation (1) represents the expected payo⁄ of a manager who invests
in the risky bond. With probability 1 ￿ q there is no default and the manager gets a return
￿=p and the reward W. If instead there is default, the manager gets zero revenues and no
reward. Similarly, the right-hand side of equation (1) represents the expected payo⁄ of a
manager who invests in the riskless asset. He gets always a return ￿R, but he obtains the
reward only if there is default.4
In order to characterize the price distortion generated by W, we de￿ne the premium ￿





The indi⁄erence condition (1) immediately implies that ￿ = 0 when there is no reward
scheme, that is, W = 0. In this case, fund managers care only about the expected returns
of the bond and the premium is zero. When instead W > 0, the premium can be negative
or positive. In particular, if q > 1=2, the payo⁄of the risky bond is skewed to the left as the
probability of default is larger than the probability of no default. In this case, investing in
the riskless asset has an advantage over the risky bond as this ensures the reward payment
with larger probability. If the expected return of the two assets were equal, all managers
would prefer the riskless one, because of this advantage. Thus, in equilibrium there must be
a positive premium on the risky bond to induce managers to hold it. Similarly, if q < 1=2 the
payo⁄of the risky bond is skewed to the right. In this case, the risky bond has an advantage
and the premium is negative.
This simple example is suggestive, but it clearly calls for microfoundations behind the
reward scheme. The story we have in mind is a story of career concerns, which needs both a
dynamic environment and some form of heterogeneous information. In the rest of the paper,
we build a dynamic general equilibrium model of delegated portfolio management with in-
4The equlibrium price is consistent with the assumption that 1=p > R if R > W (1 ￿ 2q)=q.
7formed and uninformed fund managers, where the default risk is time-varying. Investors need
fund managers to manage their capital. Based on their investment performance, investors
learn about their type and make their ￿ring decision. This model generates an incentive
scheme similar to this example, where W is an equilibrium object equal to the discounted
expected utility of an uninformed manager who retains his job. In particular, uninformed
managers￿career concerns generate a reputational premium analogous to the one described
above. We show that the presence of such a reputational premium magni￿es the volatility
of asset prices.
3 Model
Consider an in￿nite-horizon economy, set in discrete time, populated by three groups of
agents: investors, fund managers and bond sellers.
There is a measure ￿ of in￿nitely lived, risk neutral investors with discount rate ￿. At
the beginning of each period, they receive a unit endowment of consumption goods. This
endowment can be invested in two ways: in a riskless asset which pays a ￿xed gross rate of
return R > 1 at the end of the period or in risky bonds that have a random payo⁄ 0 or 1 at
the end of the period.
The risky bonds are traded at the beginning of period t at the price pt. Their end-of-
period payo⁄ depends on the aggregate shock ￿t 2 f0;1g. If ￿t = 1 there is ￿default￿and
they pay zero, if ￿t = 1 there is no default and they pay one unit of consumption. The
probability of default is given by qt, which is an iid random variable drawn at the beginning
of period t from the cumulative distribution function F (q) with support [q;q].
Risky bonds are supplied by bond sellers, whose behavior is mechanical. At the beginning
of each period, they need to borrow bt, that is, there is an inelastic nominal supply bt of
bonds. The bond supply bt is a random variable drawn independently each period from a
uniform distribution on [b;b].5 The supply shock bt is not observed by investors and fund
managers. Its role is to ensure that the bond market price is not always fully revealing.
Notice that all the assets pay back at the end of the period so that the investment takes
place within the period and there is no technology to transfer capital across periods. This
drastically simpli￿es the investors￿behavior given that there is no saving decision: at the
beginning of each period they fully invest their unit endowment and at the end of the period
they fully consume the returns of their investment.
5It is possible to derive the behavior of bond sellers from ￿rst principles, by assuming that there are
overlapping generations of two-period lived bond sellers who invest in risky projects and default on their
debt as in Guerrieri and Kondor (2009). For simplicity of exposition, here we omit this treatment.
8Investors cannot invest their endowment on their own, they need to employ a fund man-
ager. Fund managers are also in￿nitely lived, risk neutral and have discount factor ￿. Each
investor can employ only one fund manager and a fund manager can work only for a single
investor. For simplicity, we ￿x the contract between investors and fund managers and assume
that fund managers keep a share ￿ of the returns and leave the rest to the investors. We also
assume that fund managers must fully consume their share of returns in each period.
There are two types of fund managers: informed (I) and uninformed (U). There is a mass
MI of informed managers and a large continuum of uninformed managers. The manager￿ s
type is his own private information. Informed managers have an informational advantage:
they observe the realization of ￿t at the beginning of period t, while all other agents only
observe ￿t at the end of the period.6 Uninformed managers only observe the probability
of default qt at the beginning to the period. After the investment payo⁄s are realized, the
investor decides whether to retain his manager or to ￿re him and hire a new one. We will
specify in a moment how the labor market for managers works.
To complete the description of the environment we need to specify the timing of the
agents￿actions and the functioning of the bond market and of the labor market.
Timing. Each period is divided in two stages. In the ￿rst stage, each employed manager
chooses how to invest the unit of capital he manages and the bond market clears. In the
second stage, investors observe the return of their manager￿ s investment and decide whether
to ￿re him. After ￿ring decisions have been made, the investors without a manager are
randomly matched to unemployed managers on the labor market.
The bond market. In the ￿rst stage of period t, each manager submits a demand
schedule for risky bonds to an auctioneer. For simplicity, we restrict managers to three
choices: invest zero, invest 1 unit of consumption goods, or declare indi⁄erence between 0
or 1, an option we denote by f0;1g. Therefore, a demand schedule is a map d : R+ !
f0;1;f0;1gg which for any price p ￿ 0 gives the manager￿ s demand d(p). The auctioneer
collects all the demand schedules, selects the equilibrium price and assigns the bonds to
the managers. In particular, if p is the equilibrium price, managers with demand d(p) = 1
receive 1=p bonds, managers with d(p) = 0 receive no bonds, and managers with demand
d(p) = f0;1g are selected randomly to receive 0 or 1=p bonds so as to clear the market.
The labor market. In the second stage of period t, an investor observes whether his
manager invested in the riskless or in the risky asset in the previous stage and observes the
6The extreme assumption that informed managers have perfect information is not crucial for our argu-
ment. However, as we will see, it greatly simpli￿es the analysis of the investors￿beliefs, making the model
more tractable.
9realized value of ￿t. For technical reasons, it is useful to assume that, at the same time, the
investor receives an additional exogenous signal. This signal is denoted by ￿i;t, for manager
i at time t, and can take two values, 0 and 1. If the manager is informed the signal is always
￿i;t = 0. If the manager is uninformed, the signal is ￿i;t = 0 with probability ! and ￿i;t = 1
with probability 1￿!. Therefore, with probability 1￿! the type of the uninformed manager
is perfectly revealed. We will discuss the role of this exogenous signal when we analyze the
equilibrium. Given all the information available, the investor updates his beliefs about the
manager￿ s type and chooses whether to retain him or ￿re him and hire a new one.
To ensure that the pool of unemployed managers always contains informed managers,
we assume that in the second stage of period t an investor-manager match is exogenously
terminated with probability 1 ￿ ￿. At the end of period t, all investors who do not have
a manager￿ either because they ￿red him or because of exogenous termination￿ search for
one. At the same time, unemployed managers choose either to pay a cost ￿ ￿ ￿R and
look for a job or to stay inactive.7 Then matching takes place. The matching technology
is Leontief: given S searching investors and N unemployed managers looking for a job,
the number of matches created is minfS;Ng. Therefore, the probability of being matched
is minfS;Ng=S for the investors and minfS;Ng=N for the managers. Our assumptions
ensure that, in equilibrium, investors are always on the short side of the market, that is,
S < N, so that investors are always matched with probability 1.
Given that there is a continuum of agents, an investor will never meet the same manager
twice. Moreover, we assume that an investor can only observe the trading history of the
manager he employs.8 Therefore, from the point of view of the investors, all newly employed
managers are observationally equivalent and the probability that a newly employed manager
is informed is equal to the fraction of informed managers in the unemployment pool.
In specifying preferences, contracts and the market structure, we have made a number of
simplifying assumptions. The role of these assumptions is to allow us to focus the analysis
on two key decision variables: the fund managers￿decision whether to invest in the riskless
or in the risky asset and the investors￿decision to retain or ￿re their managers at the end
of each period. Investors acquire information on whether their fund manager is informed
or uninformed by observing their investment decisions and their realized returns. They ￿re
the fund manager whenever their belief about the quality of the manager is lower than the
average quality of a newly hired manager. This ￿ring decision is the source of career concerns
7The assumption ￿ ￿ ￿R is su¢ cient to ensure that it is pro￿table for an informed manager to search
for a job.
8This assumption is necessary because some jobs are exogenously terminated with probability ￿. In
Guerrieri and Kondor (2009) we assume that managers die instead of being exogenously separated and
hence we can allow managers￿histories to be public information.
10for the fund managers.
4 Equilibrium
We now de￿ne and construct a stationary symmetric equilibrium. In general, given the
signalling nature of the game, there are multiple equilibria, as informed managers can take
di⁄erent actions to signal their type. Here we focus on equilibria where informed managers
signal their type by making the ￿right￿ investment decisions, i.e., by making investment
decisions that maximize expected returns conditional on their information. Moreover, we
study equilibria where prices are not fully revealing so that informed managers make higher
expected returns than uninformed managers and investors strictly prefer hiring informed
managers.
4.1 Equilibrium De￿nition
In a stationary equilibrium, the measures of employed managers, informed and uninformed,
are constant and equal, respectively, to ￿I and ￿U. As we will show below, investors are
on the short side of the job market, so they are always matched and ￿I + ￿U = ￿. All
informed managers submit the same demand schedule contingent on the realization of the
default shock ￿t. We denote this demand schedule by dI (p;￿t). Similarly, all uninformed
managers submit the same demand schedule contingent on the default probability qt, which
we denote by dU(p;qt).
The auctioneer picks the price and the bond allocation consistent with the demand sched-
ules submitted by the agents and with market clearing. At each time t, there are three ag-
gregate shocks: the default probability qt, the default shock ￿t, and the supply shock bt. The
equilibrium price depends on the aggregate shocks according to the function pt = P(qt;￿t;bt).
The equilibrium bond allocation also depends on the aggregate shocks (qt;￿t;bt), and is de-
scribed by a function X(d;qt;￿t;bt) which gives the equilibrium probability of investing in
risky bonds for a manager demanding d 2 f0;1;f0;1gg. In order to be consistent with the
demand schedules, the function X must satisfy X(0;qt;￿t;bt) = 0 and X(1;qt;￿t;bt) = 1,
while X(f0;1g;qt;￿t;bt) can take any value in [0;1].
Let xI
t ￿ X(dI (pt;￿t);qt;￿t;bt) and xU
t ￿ X(dU (pt;qt);qt;￿t;bt) denote the equilibrium
probabilities of investing in risky bonds respectively for informed and uninformed managers.
By the law of large numbers, xI
t and xU
t are also equal to the fraction of informed and









with equality when the equilibrium price pt is strictly positive.
Let ￿i;t 2 f0;1g denote the realized investment in the risky asset for manager i. Since
managers can choose to demand f0;1g￿ i.e., they can tell the auctioneer that they are
indi⁄erent between 0 and 1￿ ￿i;t is, in general, a random variable and the probability of
￿i;t = 1 is xI
t for the informed agent and xU
t for the uninformed agent.
At the beginning of each period t, there is a distribution of existing investor-manager
matches. The investor matched with manager i believes that with probability ￿i;t the man-
ager is informed. Then, after observing the realized investment ￿i;t, the exogenous signal






Since ￿i;t appears in this expression, beliefs depend in general on the whole past history of the
investor-manager match. Therefore, the distribution of beliefs is the only equilibrium object
which does not depend only on (qt;￿t;bt). However, thanks to our simplifying assumptions,
we can focus on equilibria where the equilibrium ￿ring decision only depends on the current
values of ￿i;t;￿i;t;￿t;pt and where we do not need to keep track of belief dynamics explicitly.
In particular, we describe the ￿ring strategy using the function ￿i;t = ￿(￿i;t;￿i;t;￿t;pt),
where ￿i;t = 1 corresponds to ￿ring and ￿i;t = 0 to retention. Let us denote by ￿
s
t the




t;s], where the expectation is taken with respect to ￿i;t and ￿i;t. Again,




t are also equal to the fraction of informed and
uninformed that are ￿red at time t.
In a stationary equilibrium, the values of ￿I and ￿U have to be consistent with equilibrium
job market ￿ ows. Let ￿ denote the ratio of searching investors to searching managers, and,
in particular, let NI
t and NU
t denote the measures of informed and uninformed managers
looking for a job. At the end of each period, a fraction ￿
s
t of employed managers of type s
is ￿red and a fraction 1￿￿ of the remaining managers is exogenously separated. Since ￿Ns
t
managers of type s are matched at the end of each period, the following condition ensures
the stationarity of ￿s:
[￿
s








t is a function of the shocks (qt;￿t;bt), equation (2) shows that Ns
t will also
be, in general, functions of the same shocks. This gives us our last equilibrium object, the








, and is then also a function of (qt;￿t;bt).
We can now write down the optimization problems of investors and managers. From now
on we drop the time subscripts from all the stationary objects.
At the end of time t, an investor with posterior belief ￿0 that his manager is informed,
chooses to ￿re him only if the value of hiring a random new manager, informed with proba-
bility ", is higher than the value of keeping him. Given that the probability for an investor




(1 ￿ ￿)V (￿
0) + ￿V ("); (3)
where V (￿) denotes the value of being matched with a manager informed with probability
￿, that is,
V (￿) = E [(1 ￿ ￿)(￿(1 ￿ ￿)=p + (1 ￿ ￿)R) + ￿J (H (￿;￿;￿;￿;p);")j￿]:
Notice that the prior belief ￿ a⁄ects the right-hand-side of the above expression in two ways:
directly through the Bayes rule H and through the distribution of ￿. A manager informed
with probability ￿ invests in the risky bond, ￿ = 1, with probability ￿xI +(1 ￿ ￿)xU. If the
manager invests in the risky bond, the investor gets (1 ￿ ￿)=p only if there is no default, while
if the manager invests in the riskless asset, the investor gets (1 ￿ ￿)R for sure. Moreover,
the investor updates his belief about the manager type after observing his investment ￿, his
signal ￿, the default state ￿, and the price p, according to Bayes rule ￿0 = H (￿;￿;￿;￿;p).
Given the posterior belief, he makes his ￿ring decision to maximize problem (3) and this
determines his continuation utility.
Let us now turn to the managers￿behavior. The uninformed managers￿behavior is
characterized by the Bellman equation9
W = E[ max
d2f0;1;f0;1gg
E[X (d;a)(￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=p + [1 ￿ ￿(1;￿;￿;p)]￿￿W) + (4)
(1 ￿ X (d;a))(￿R + [1 ￿ ￿(0;￿;￿;p)]￿￿W) j p;q]];
where W denotes the expected utility of an employed uninformed manager at the beginning
of a period, before the realization of q. The maximization problem on the right-hand side
can be interpreted as follows. Given his choice of d, the manager receives risky bonds
9For consistency of notation, we adopt the convention that when p = 0 and ￿ = 1 the rate of return
(1 ￿ ￿)=p is zero. Notice also that the managers￿demand at o⁄-the-equilibrium-path prices is not pinned
down by individual optimality.
13with probability X (d;a). Then, if there is no default he receives the current return ￿=p,
while if there is default his current return is zero. If he is not ￿red￿ with probability
1 ￿ ￿(1;￿;￿;p)￿ and the match is not exogenously terminated￿ with probability ￿￿ he
keeps his job and receives the continuation utility ￿W. If he loses his job, he gets zero
continuation utility, given the free entry condition (5). With probability 1 ￿ X (d;a) the
manager receives the riskless bond. He then always receives the safe current return ￿R.
His continuation utility is computed as above, except that his ￿ring probability is now
￿(0;￿;￿;p). The Bellman equation that characterizes the informed managers￿behavior is
the same, except that the expectation can be conditioned on p and ￿.
Finally, since we assumed that there is a large continuum of uninformed managers and
the cost of searching is ￿, the following free entry condition must hold:
￿W ￿ ￿ = 0: (5)
Given that the informed managers have a richer information set than the uninformed ones,
they can always mimic them and their expected utility of being employed is higher than
W.10 This implies that unemployed informed managers get positive expected utility when




I ￿ (1 ￿ ￿
I
t)￿￿
I for all t. (6)
The timeline below summarizes the timing in a stationary environment.
We are now ready to de￿ne an equilibrium.
De￿nition 1 A stationary symmetric equilibrium is given by demand schedules dI(p;￿)
and dU (p;q), a price function P(q;￿;b), a bond allocation X (d;q;￿;b), a ￿ring strategy
10The value of being employed informed managers satis￿es the same Bellman equation (4) for W, except
that the expectation is conditional on p and ￿, where recall that q = E [￿].
14￿(￿;￿;￿;p), a law of motion for the investor beliefs H, a measure of employed informed
managers ￿I and a matching probability for unemployed managers ￿, such that:
1. the fund managers￿demand schedules are optimal, taking as given the equilibrium price
and the investors￿￿ring strategy;
2. the investors￿￿ring strategy is optimal given investors￿beliefs, the equilibrium price
and the managers￿demand schedules;
3. the bond allocation is consistent with the managers￿demand schedules;
4. the bond market clears;
5. investors￿beliefs H are consistent with Bayes￿law on the equilibrium path;
6. ￿I and ￿ are consistent with stationary labor market ￿ows and with managers￿free
entry.
4.2 Characterization
We now show that, under appropriate assumptions, a stationary equilibrium exists. In
particular, we assume that
b < ￿ ￿ M
I, b > M













We will discuss the role of these assumptions as we describe the equilibrium.
Given these assumptions, we can construct an equilibrium in which equilibrium prices
are sometimes fully revealing and sometimes completely uninformative, depending on the
realization of the variable z(￿;b) ￿ b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿I. The variable z can be interpreted as the
supply of risky bonds net of the potential demand of informed managers, who are willing to
demand risky bonds when ￿ = 0.
Proposition 1 Under assumptions A1-A3, there exists a stationary symmetric equilibrium






R if z(￿;b) 2 [b ￿ ￿I;b)
~ P (q) if z(￿;b) 2 [b;b ￿ ￿I]
0 if z(￿;b) 2 (b ￿ ￿I;b]
; (7)




f0;1g if p = 1=R





0 if p = 0
f0;1g otherwise
;
the bond allocation is
X(d;q;￿;b) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
d if d 2 f0;1g
b
￿ if d = f0;1g and z(￿;b) 2 [b ￿ ￿I;b)
z(￿;b)
￿U if d = f0;1g, z(￿;b) 2 [b;b ￿ ￿I]
0 if d = f0;1g and z(￿;b) 2 (b ￿ ￿I;b]
;
and the ￿ring rule is
￿(￿;￿;￿;p) =
(
0 if ￿ = 0 and either p = 1=R or ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿
1 otherwise
:
The equilibrium features three possible regimes of information revelation. First, if the
bond price is equal to zero default is revealed, no manager invests in risky bonds and hence
no manager is ￿red, except if ￿ = 1. Second, if the bond price is equal to 1=R no default
is revealed and the two assets have the same safe return. In this case, all managers are
indi⁄erent between the two assets and are never ￿red, except if ￿ = 1. Third, if the price is
equal to ~ P (q) no information is revealed. In this case, the informed managers demand the
risky bond if and only if there is no default, while the uninformed managers are the marginal
traders and are indi⁄erent between the risky bond and the risk-free asset. The auctioneer
allocates the risky bonds to the informed managers if they demand any. The residual bonds
are allocated randomly to a fraction of uninformed managers to clear the market. Informed
managers are never ￿red while uninformed managers are ￿red whenever their investment
reveals that they are not informed.
Let us now describe more in detail how equilibrium prices reveal information. If p = 1=R,
then z 2 [b ￿ ￿I;b). In this case, uninformed managers learn that ￿ = 1 because z can be
smaller than b only if a positive mass of informed managers is demanding risky bonds, which
only happens if ￿ = 1. If p = 0, then z 2 (b￿￿I;b]. In this case, uninformed managers learn
that ￿ = 0 because z can be greater than b￿￿I only if no informed managers are demanding
risky bonds, which only happens if ￿ = 0. Finally, when p = ~ P (q), then z 2 [b;b ￿ ￿I] and
16the uninformed managers￿updated beliefs are:
Pr(￿ = 1jp = ~ P (q)) =
Pr(￿ = 1;z 2 [b;b ￿ ￿I])
Pr(￿ = 1;z 2 [b;b ￿ ￿I]) + Pr(￿ = 0;z 2 [b;b ￿ ￿I])
: (8)
Since b is independent of ￿ and uniformly distributed on [b;b], we have
Pr(￿ = 1;z 2 [b;b ￿ ￿
I]) = q Pr(b 2 [b;b ￿ ￿
I]) = q
b ￿ b ￿ ￿I
b ￿ b
and
Pr(￿ = 0;z 2 [b;b ￿ ￿
I]) = (1 ￿ q)Pr(b 2 [b + ￿
I;b]) = (1 ￿ q)
b ￿ b ￿ ￿I
b ￿ b
;
where Assumption A1 guarantees that b ￿ b > ￿I, so that these are strictly positive prob-
abilities. Substituting in (8) it follows that Pr(￿ = 1jp = ~ P (q)) = q and the price ~ P (q) is
completely uninformative.
Next, let us verify that the managers￿demand schedules are optimal. For informed
managers, it is easy to see that their demand is optimal both because it maximizes their
current expected returns and because it maximizes their continuation utility, by ensuring
that they are never ￿red.
Turning to uninformed managers, their behavior is characterized by the Bellman equation
(4). When prices are fully revealing, it is easy to check that the uninformed managers￿
strategy is optimal, as it perfectly mimics the informed managers￿behavior. Let us then
focus on the case of non-revealing prices, when p = ~ P (q). In this case, substituting the












+ (1 ￿ X (d;q;￿;b))(￿R + ￿!￿￿W) j p;q
￿
:
We need to check that when p = ~ P (q) it is optimal for the uninformed manager to demand
d = f0;1g. In the appendix, we show that the allocation probability X (f0;1g;q;￿;b) is
independent of ￿, conditional on q and p = ~ P (q). This implies that d = f0;1g is optimal








= ￿R + q!￿￿W: (9)
This condition is analogous to condition (1) in the example of Section 2. The left-hand side
represents the expected payo⁄of investing in risky bonds and the right-hand side represents
the expected payo⁄ of investing in the riskless asset. Notice that when investing in risky
17bonds the manager is ￿red when there is no default￿ with probability (1 ￿ q)￿ while when
investing in riskless bonds he is ￿red when default occurs￿ with probability q. Moreover, in
both cases he is ￿red if the exogenous signal ￿ reveals that he is uninformed￿ with probability
!. Rearranging condition (9), we obtain an explicit expression for the equilibrium price under
no information revelation, for given W:
~ P (q) =
￿ (1 ￿ q)
￿R ￿ (1 ￿ 2q)￿!￿W
for all q 2 [q;q]: (10)
Assumption A3 is su¢ cient to ensure that ~ P (q) 2 (0;1=R) to avoid extreme equilibria where
managers are willing to accept returns smaller than R in every state of the world just to
improve their reputation.
To complete the characterization of equilibrium prices, it remains to solve for W, the
expected utility of employed uninformed managers. Using the Bellman equation (4), after
some algebra, we obtain
W = ￿R + [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)E (q)]￿!￿W; (11)
where ￿ ￿ ￿I=(b￿b) is the probability that the price is fully revealing. To interpret this ex-
pression, notice that an uninformed manager is indi⁄erent between following his equilibrium
strategy and always buying the riskless asset.11 Under this strategy, the uninformed manager
always receives current returns equal to ￿R. Then, if prices are fully revealing he is only ￿red
for exogenous reasons, while if prices are non-revealing he is also ￿red when default occurs,
which happens with expected probability E (q). Also, notice that W is increasing in the
measure of employed informed managers ￿I. This is because the more employed managers
are informed, the higher is the probability that prices are fully revealing and hence that
uninformed manager are not ￿red.12 Interestingly, expression (10) shows that W, and hence
￿I, has a non-monotonic e⁄ect on prices: ~ P (q) is increasing in ￿I if and only if q < 1=2.
It is easy to check that the bond allocation X (d;q;￿;b) is consistent with the managers￿
demand and that the bond market always clears. In particular, when z(￿;b) 2 (b ￿ ￿I;b],
default is fully revealed and the price is 0. In this case, both supply and demand of bonds
are zero, as no manager demands the risky bond. When z 2 [b￿￿I;b), no default is revealed
11Always buying the riskless asset is optimal when prices are fully revealing, since either risky bonds always
default or they are equivalent to riskless bonds. It is also optimal when prices are non-revealing, because
then, by construction, the price makes uninformed managers indi⁄erent between the two assets.
12Although in our model the amount of information in prices switches between the extremes, the externality
would survive in more general frameworks with regimes of partial revelation. In fact, the same externality
is the basis of the classic Grossman-Stiglitz paradox: more informed agents increase the information content
of prices, which improves the relative pro￿tability of uninformed agents￿trades.
18and all managers are indi⁄erent between risky bonds and the riskless asset. In this case,
risky bonds are randomly allocated to all managers, informed and uninformed, and the
probability of investing in risky bonds is equal to b=￿. When z(￿;b) 2 [b;b ￿ ￿I], informed
managers invest in the bond if and only if there is default and only uninformed managers
are indi⁄erent. Hence, to clear the market, the probability of investing in the bond for a
manager who is indi⁄erent must be equal to (b ￿ ￿I)=￿U if ￿ = 0 and to b=￿U if ￿ = 1,
or, more compactly, to z(￿;b)=￿U. Assumption A1 ensures that in all these cases we have
X (d;q;￿;b) 2 (0;1), the details are in the appendix.
Next, we need to show that the investors￿￿ring rule ￿(￿;￿;￿;p) is optimal. As problem
(3) shows, each period investors￿current payo⁄s are given by a share 1 ￿ ￿ of the return on
their current investment. The expected return made by informed and uninformed managers
is the same when p = 1=R or p = 0, and there is full revelation. However, when p = ~ P (q),
the expected return of an informed manager is higher. Therefore, V (￿) is increasing in ￿
and investors prefer to have informed managers investing their capital. Given the updated
belief ￿0 and the fraction of informed managers in the unemployment pool ", problem (3)
implies that an investor will ￿re his manager if and only if ￿0 < ". Therefore, to check that
the ￿ring rule is optimal we need to show that, for any belief ￿ that can arise in equilibrium,
the updated belief ￿0 is greater than " whenever ￿ = 0 and either p = 1=R or ￿ = 1￿￿ and is
smaller than " otherwise. The second part of this statement is easy to check, because ￿ = 1
or ￿ 6= 1 ￿ ￿ and p < 1=R can only happen when the manager is uninformed. Therefore,
in this case ￿ = 0 which is always smaller than " > 0.13 That is, when the manager is
exogenously revealed to be uninformed or when he makes a mistake at a non-revealing price,
he is immediately identi￿ed and ￿red. The ￿rst part of the statement above is harder to
check because ￿0 depends on the history of the match and " depends on the current shocks.
In the appendix, we show that Assumption A2 is su¢ cient to ensure that in this case ￿0 > "
always holds.
Finally, in the appendix we derive the equilibrium values of ￿, ￿I, and ￿U consistent with
stationary labor market ￿ ows and with managers￿free entry. We also show that ￿ 2 (0;1)
so that investors are always on the short side of the market.
4.3 Ampli￿cation
We now compare the behavior of our model with a benchmark model with no career con-
cerns. This allows us to derive our main result: managers￿career concerns magnify the price
volatility of risky bonds.
13See the appendix for the proof that " > 0.
19As a benchmark model with no career concerns, consider our model with MI = 0. In this
case, all managers are uninformed, so investors are indi⁄erent between keeping the manager
working for them and hiring a new one. Then, there exists an equilibrium where managers
are never ￿red and maximize their expected returns in each period. We call this equilibrium
the benchmark equilibrium. The bond price in the benchmark equilibrium is determined by





for all q 2 [q;q]: (12)
Similarly to section 2, when there is no information revelation, let ￿(q) be the di⁄erence





We call ￿(q) the reputational premium because it characterizes the price distortion generated
by the career concerns of the uninformed managers. Condition (12) immediately implies that
the reputational premium in the benchmark equilibrium with no career concerns, ￿B (q), is
equal to zero for all q 2 [q;q].
When instead there is a positive measure of informed managers, MI > 0, the reputational
premium can be negative or positive. In particular, when pt = 1=R and there is full revelation
of no default the premium is equal to zero, while when pt = 0 and there is full revelation
of default there is no bond trade and the premium is not well de￿ned. When instead there
is no revelation and pt = ~ P (q), it is easy to check that ￿(q) is negative if and only if
q < 1=2. Assumption A3 ensures that there exists an equilibrium with q < 1=2 < q, so
that the equilibrium premium switches sign depending on the realization of q. When the
default probability is particularly low, investing in the risky bond is a relatively safe bet
because there is a higher chance to mimic the investment of the informed managers. Hence,
uninformed managers have a high probability of not being ￿red and this compensates them
for a negative premium (discount) on the bond. When instead the default probability is
high, uninformed managers investing in the risky bond have a large probability of being
￿red and hence they demand a positive premium. In short, the equilibrium price re￿ ects
this preference for large probability events. It follows that in equilibrium, the reputational
premium varies with q, magnifying the volatility of prices.
Figure 2 represents graphically the price schedule ~ P (q) de￿ned in (10) and the price
schedule for the benchmark equilibrium P B (q) de￿ned in (12). The intersection of these
two functions at the realized default probability q, give the prices in our equilibrium and

















Figure 2: The ￿gure plots the price schedule in the model with career concerns P(q) together
with the price schedule for the benchmark equilibrium P B (q). The parameters used are:
MI = :5, ￿ = 2, ￿ = :99, ￿ = :85, ! = :5, ￿ = :1, b ￿ b = :71, q = :3, q = 1, E (q) = :6.
in the benchmark one respectively. The ￿gure shows that both the pricing schedules are
monotonically decreasing in q and they intersect at q = 1=2, so that ￿(q) > 0 if and only
if q > 1=2. Moreover, ~ P (q) is steeper than P B (q) at q = 1=2 and for q not too close to 1.
This immediately implies that the price of the risky bond reacts more to a change in q in our
model in comparison to the benchmark as long as q is not too high. However, we can prove
a more general result. Next proposition states our main ampli￿cation result: the volatility
of log prices (and hence of log spreads) is always higher in our model with career concerns
relative to the benchmark equilibrium.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, the reputational premium ￿(q) is positive whenever q < 1=2,
and negative otherwise. Moreover, equilibrium prices are more volatile than in the benchmark





Proposition 2 shows that managers￿career concerns amplify the price reaction of risky
bonds to changes in their default risk. In particular, when the default risk suddenly increases,
the economy can switch from regimes with low bond spreads (high p) to regimes with high
bond spreads (low p). The ￿rst type of regimes are frequently described as regimes of
abundant liquidity or with traders reaching for yield. To describe phenomena where the
21economy switches to the second type of regime, common terms are ￿ight-to-quality, ￿ight-
to-liquidity, disappeared liquidity, or drop in risk appetite. In our model, phenomena of
this type can arise even if fund managers are risk-neutral and their aggregate funds are
constant. In good times, when the default probability of credit instruments is low, it is very
attractive for uninformed managers to invest in these instruments, because they are likely
to gain high returns and hence improve their reputation. If suddenly the default probability
increases, investing in the risky asset becomes less appealing because their reputation starts
deteriorating. Hence, prices increase not only because of the higher probability of default,
but also because of an additional premium coming from career concerns.
It is well established in the literature that the premium on risky assets is time-varying
and, in particular, that it in good times is lower than in bad times. However, standard
explanations are based on time-varying marginal utility of consumption, on time-varying
probability of disasters or on slow-moving component in consumption risk. A common
denominator of these di⁄erent mechanisms is that the premium is always positive. Our
model generates a time-varying component of the premium on risky assets that can be
negative. In good times some managers are willing to take risky bets without the su¢ cient
compensation in returns. This unique implication of our model seems consistent with a
number of empirical observations that we have described in the introduction (Du¢ e et al.,
2003, Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004, and Coval, Jurek and Sta⁄ord, 2008).
The ampli￿cation e⁄ect is going to be stronger the more serious career concerns are, that
is, the more managers care about their reputation. In particular, this is the case when the
entry cost ￿ is higher. Given that in equilibrium there is free-entry of uninformed managers,
the higher is the entry cost, the smaller is the measure of uninformed managers who look for
a job. This increases the hiring probability for all managers and hence increases the measure
of informed managers who are employed. As we have discussed above, employed informed
managers generate a positive externality for the uninformed managers. The more employed
managers are informed the higher is the probability that prices will reveal information about
the default state, hence increasing the expected utility of employed managers who are un-
informed. This makes their reputation more valuable and amplifes the distortion generated
by career concerns. This suggests that we should expect higher price volatility in markets of
more complex ￿nancial instruments where setting up a fund requires more resources. The
next proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 3 The ampli￿cation e⁄ect is stronger the higher is the entry cost ￿.
The e⁄ect on ampli￿cation of the discount factor, ￿, and of the probability of an ex-
ogenous revealing signal, 1 ￿ !, is ambiguous. On the one hand, for given ￿I, when ￿
22is higher, managers care more about their future and hence about their reputation. Also,
career concerns are stronger when there is a lower chance that managers lose their job for
exogenous reasons and hence when ! is higher. However, on the other hand, an increase in
either one of these parameters also increases the expected utility of being employed. More
uninformed managers will search for a job, reducing the hiring probability and the mea-
sure of informed employed managers. This makes price less informative and hence decreases
the expected value of being employed and the returns to reputation. The two e⁄ects go in
opposite directions and make the overall e⁄ect in general ambiguous.
4.4 Limit Equilibrium
It is interesting to explore our model in the limit case with MI ! 0. This limit is very
tractable and insightful at the same time. We show that as MI ! 0, the sequence of
stationary equilibria constructed so far converges to a limit equilibrium where the bond
price never reveals any information, and is constant over time. Intuitively, this can be the
case because as the fraction of informed managers is in￿nitesimal, the uninformed managers
demand essentially all the bonds supplied and hence don￿ t learn any information from the
equilibrium price.
Proposition 4 14Under assumption A1-A3, when MI ! 0, there exists a limit equilibrium
where the price P (q) 2 (0;1=R) is determined by the indi⁄erence condition of the uninformed
managers, the demand schedule for informed managers is dI(p;￿) = 1 ￿ ￿ for all p and ￿,




d if d 2 f0;1g
b
￿ if d = f0;1g
;
and the investors￿strategy is
￿(￿;￿;￿) =
(
0 if ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿
1 if ￿ 6= 1 ￿ ￿ or ￿ = 1
:
In a limit equilibrium, prices never reveal any information and uninformed managers are
always the marginal traders. Informed managers demand the risky bond if and only if there
is no default, while uninformed managers cannot follow the same strategy. The equilibrium
price will make them indi⁄erent between demanding the risky bond and the riskless asset,
so that bonds can be allocated to clear the market. At the end of the period, investors
14The proof of this proposition is an obvious generalization of the proof of Proposition 1 and hence omitted.
23￿re managers who failed to mimic the informed managers￿strategy and hence revealed to
be uninformed. Clearly, informed managers are never ￿red. Once again, assumption A1
guarantees that b=￿ 2 (0;1) for any b, so that there are always some uninformed managers
investing in the risky bond and some investing in the risk-free asset.
For a given default probability q, the equilibrium price P (q) is determined by the same in-
di⁄erence condition (10), where the expected continuation utility of an employed uninformed
manager W satis￿es condition (11) with ￿I ! 0, that is,
W = ￿R + E (q)￿!￿W: (14)






1 ￿ ￿!￿E (q)
1 ￿ ￿!￿ (E (q) + 1 ￿ 2q)
￿
for all q 2 [q;q]:
The equilibrium price immediately shows that also in the limit equilibrium the reputa-
tional premium ￿(q) varies with q and can be positive or negative depending on q being
below or above 1=2. This shows that the reputational premium does not disappear when
the informational asymmetry becomes in￿nitesimal, that is, as MI ! 0. It is interesting to
notice that there is a discontinuity at MI = 0, given that the benchmark equilibrium does
not survive as long as MI > 0, even if MI ! 0.
5 Persistent Default Risk
In this section, we generalize the model to allow for persistent default probability qt. In
particular, we allow qt to be distributed according to a ￿rst-order Markov process with
cumulative density function G(qtjqt￿1) with the same support [q;q]. The environment is a
natural generalization of the one with iid shocks.
Using a numerical example, we illustrate that when qt is persistent, there are two e⁄ects
on the reputational premium. First, there is the direct e⁄ect that a higher default probability
today increases the chance of a higher default probability in the future. This e⁄ect leads to
larger premium when the default risk is high, and lower discount when the default risk is low.
Second, there is an indirect e⁄ect due to the fact that the measure of employed informed
managers is now varying over time. When there are more employed informed managers
the probability that prices reveal information is higher and then the expected utility of
uninformed managers is higher. This increases the reputational e⁄ect of career concerns and
implies that the price of the risky bond might change even if the fundamentals, that is, the
24perceived default risk, do not.
5.1 Equilibrium with persistent shocks
First, we de￿ne an equilibrium for the model where the default probability q follows a ￿rst-
order Markov process. In this case, a stationary equilibrium does not exist and we focus on
Markovian equilibria where q and ￿I become state variables.15
De￿nition 2 A Markovian symmetric equilibrium is given by demand schedules dI(p;￿) and
dU (p;q), a price function P(q;￿;b;￿I), a bond allocation X
￿
d;q;￿;b;￿I￿
, a ￿ring strategy
￿(￿;￿;￿;p), a law of motion for the investor beliefs H, a law of motion for the measure of





1. the fund managers￿demand schedules are optimal, taking as given the equilibrium price
and the investors￿￿ring strategy;
2. the investors￿￿ring strategy is optimal given investors￿beliefs, the equilibrium price
and the managers￿demand schedules;
3. the bond allocation is consistent with the managers￿demand schedules;
4. the bond market clears;
5. investors￿beliefs H are consistent with Bayes￿law on the equilibrium path;
6. G(q;￿I) and ￿
￿
q;￿I￿
are consistent with stationary labor market ￿ows and with man-
agers￿free entry.
We now characterize a Markovian equilibrium with similar features to the equilibrium
in the baseline model. In particular, prices can be fully revealing or completely uninforma-
tive, depending on the realization of z(￿;b;￿I) = b ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿I. As before, the variable z
represents the supply of bonds net of the potential demand of informed managers and now











if z(￿;b;￿I) 2 [b;b ￿ ￿I]
0 if z(￿;b;￿I) 2 (b ￿ ￿I;b]
; (15)
15Note, that we still omit the time subscript for ￿I; even if it is not constant anymore.
25for some function ~ P
￿
q;￿I￿




f0;1g if p = 1=R




0 if p = 0
f0;1g otherwise
; (16)




> > > > <
> > > > :
d if d 2 f0;1g
b
￿ if d = f0;1g and z(￿;b;￿I) 2 [b ￿ ￿I;b)
z(￿;b;￿I)
￿￿￿I if d = f0;1g, z(￿;b;￿I) 2 [b;b ￿ ￿I]
0 if d = f0;1g and z(￿;b;￿I) 2 (b ￿ ￿I;b]
; (17)
and the ￿ring rule is
￿(￿;￿;￿;p) =
(
0 if ￿ = 0 and either p = 1=R or ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿
1 otherwise
: (18)
This equilibrium is very similar to the one constructed in Section 4.2 for the model with
iid q, with the exception that the price, the bond allocation, and the labor market ￿ ows
now depend on the states q and ￿I. There are three revelation regimes: default is revealed,
non default is revealed and no information is revealed. Informed managers always maximize
the expected returns conditional on their information and hence demand the bond if and
only if there is default whenever p < 1=R and are indi⁄erent when p = 1=R. Uninformed
managers mimic the informed whenever the default state is revealed, while when there is
no revelation, they are indi⁄erent between risky bonds and riskless assets. The auctioneer
picks the price and the bond allocation which are consistent with the managers￿demand and
ensure market clearing. Finally, an investor ￿res his manager whenever either his investment
or the exogenous signal reveal that he is uninformed.
Let us now discuss the main di⁄erences with the iid case. First, let us look at the labor
market. As mentioned above, the ￿ ows are now not stationary, so that ￿I becomes one state
variable. As in the baseline model, given that there is a large continuum of uninformed
managers the hiring probability ￿
￿
q;￿I￿














denotes the expected value of being employed for an uninformed manager
at the end of the period which now depends on the states q and ￿I. Given that the expected
value of being employed is always higher for an informed manager than for an uninformed
26manager, all unemployed informed managers at time t search for a job. In equilibrium,
no informed manager is ￿red. Hence, the measure of employed informed managers at the
beginning of time t + 1 must be equal to the measure of informed managers employed at
time t whose job was not exogenously terminated, plus the measure of unemployed informed















One of the key equilibrium strategies is the bond demand of the uninformed agents.
Their optimization problem can be described with a Bellman equation similar to (4) with
the di⁄erence that W now depends on the two states q and ￿I. As in the baseline model, the
allocation probability X(d;q;￿;b;￿I) is independent of ￿ so that the indi⁄erence condition
for the uninformed managers is given by the analog of equation (9). Hence, when there is






￿ (1 ￿ q)



























= ￿I=(b￿b) is the probability that the price is fully revealing. It is interesting
to highlight the direct e⁄ect of q and ￿I on the expected utility W. On the one hand, the
higher is the default probability q, the higher is the expected default probability tomorrow
and hence the lower is the chance to be ￿red if investing in the riskless asset. Given that
the price makes uninformed managers indi⁄erent between investing in the two assets, this
implies that the higher q, the higher is their expected utility. On the other hand, as more
employed managers are informed, that is, the higher is ￿I, the higher is the probability that
prices are fully revealing. When there is full revelation, uninformed managers are better o⁄
because they are never ￿red and their expected utility is higher.
Finally, for the proposed equilibrium to exist, it must be that uninformed managers who
mimic the informed ones are never ￿red in equilibrium. In the iid baseline model, assumption
A2 was a su¢ cient condition to ensure that this was the case. With persistent q, we need


















, and G(q;￿I) that satisfy
equations (20)-(22) and assumptions A1, A2￿and A3 hold, there is a Markovian equilibrium,
where prices satisfy (15), managers￿demand schedules (16), the bond allocation (17), and
the ￿ring rule (18).
Using numerical methods, we ￿nd that the equilibrium exists for a wide range of para-
meters.16 Also, in all simulations we ￿nd similar qualitative properties. In the next section
we describe a representative numerical example.
Before moving to simulations, it is insightful to mention the limit case with MI ! 0, that
is, where the informational asymmetry becomes in￿nitesimal. This case is more tractable
because the measure of informed managers who are employed ￿I also converges to 0, and
hence the only state variable is q. In particular, condition (19) reduces to ￿(q) = ￿=W (q)
where
W (q) = ￿R + E[q
0jq]￿!￿E[W (q
0)jq]: (23)
It is straightforward to see that the right-hand-side of the previous equation is a contraction
and hence that there exists an equilibrium function W (q). This implies that in the limit
case, an equilibrium always exists if assumptions A1, A2￿ , and A3 are satis￿ed.
5.2 Ampli￿cation
In this section, we are interested in comparing the baseline model with iid default risk
with the model where the default risk is persistent. In particular, we want to explore the
changes in the reputational premium and hence in the ampli￿cation e⁄ect. For simplicity,
we consider the two-state case where qt 2
￿
qL;qH￿
with qL < 1=2 < qH. We assume
that in the iid case Pr
￿
qt+1 = qHjqt = q￿￿
= ￿￿ for ￿ = L;H, while in the persistent case
Pr
￿
qt+1 = qHjqt = q￿￿
= ￿￿ for ￿ = H;L, with ￿L < ￿￿ < ￿H. To help the comparison, we
denote the equilibrium variables of the iid case with an asterisk.
As in the iid case, it is interesting to see how the reputational premium varies when there
is no information revelation. When the default probability q is persistent, the reputational
premium depends not only on q, but also on the measure of employed informed managers














16Unfortunately, the assumptions of standard ￿xed-point theorems (e.g. Schauder, Banach) do not hold in






, and G(q;￿I) satis￿ng equations (20)-(22) is not guaranteed
for all parameters.
28where we have substituted for P
￿
q;￿I￿
using (21) and where W
￿
q;￿I￿
is de￿ned by expres-
sion (22). As in the iid case, the absolute value of the premium is increasing in the expected
utility of employed uninformed managers W
￿
q;￿I￿
, which represents the reward to good
reputation. However, in the iid case W was constant over time, while now it varies with
both q and ￿I, as we have discussed above.
5.2.1 Limit Case
Let us start by considering the limit case with MI ! 0. This case is particularly tractable
because the measure of informed employed managers also converges to 0 and the only state
variable is q. In this case, we can explicitly compute the expected utility of employed
informed managers contingent on the state, that is,
W (q





















In order to explore how the degree of persistency of the default risk q a⁄ects ampli￿cation,
suppose, without loss of generality, that ￿H ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ and ￿L ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿), with
￿ 2 [0;1] and ￿ 2 [0;1]. In the two extreme cases, when ￿ = 1 the shock becomes permanent
and when ￿ = 0 we are back to the iid benchmark. We are then interested in exploring how
the reputational premium varies with ￿, that is, as the persistence degree of the stochastic
process for q increases.







follows that W (q￿) is increasing in ￿￿. Moreover, from the de￿nition of ￿￿ we obtain
d￿H
d￿











decreases. This means that when q = qH and the reputational premium is positive,
the premium is ampli￿ed by persistency. On the contrary, when q = qL and there is a
reputational discount, such a discount is dampened by persistency.
5.2.2 A numerical example
The limit case is tractable at the expense of losing the e⁄ect of the measure of informed
employed managers on the reputational premium. To explore this feature of the model, we
now turn to a numerical example with MI > 0.17
17We make sure that the parameters that we pick for the numerical example satisfy assumptions A1, A3,
and condition (34), which is a weaker version of assumption A2￿derived in the Appendix.











Panel A: Law of Motion for Informed Employed Managers
































together with the 45-degree line. Panel B plots the







. The parameters used are: MI = :5, ￿ = 2, ￿ = :99, ￿ = :85, ! = :5, ￿ = :1,
b ￿ b = :71, q = :3, q = :9, ￿L = :1, and ￿H = :9.
First of all, we want to understand the dynamics of ￿I, which are endogenously deter-







functions of ￿I, together with the 45-degree line. The ￿gure shows that both functions are
increasing in ￿I: the more informed managers are employed today, the more are going to be






for all ￿I, meaning that when the default risk is high, everything else equal, more informed






cross the 45-degree line
























for all t > 0. Moreover, ￿I will gradually increase whenever q = qL and
gradually decrease whenever q = qH. This is illustrated in Panel A of Figure 4, which plots
the simulated path for ￿I for a speci￿c realization of sequence of shocks fqtgt2[1;50]. The same
￿gure shows the constant value ￿I￿ for the baseline case where q is iid, where ￿ < ￿I￿ < ￿.
So ￿I ￿ uctuates around its iid counterpart.
Once we understood the dynamics of ￿I, we can turn to the dynamics of the expected
30utility of employed uninformed managers W
￿
q;￿I￿
, which are key to determine the repu-












for all ￿I. This
is because the higher is the default probability q, the higher is the expected default prob-
ability tomorrow and hence the lower is the chance to be ￿red if investing in the riskless
asset. Given that the price makes uninformed managers indi⁄erent between investing in the
two assets, this implies that the higher q, the higher is their expected utility. This implies







are increasing functions in ￿I. For a given default risk q, as more
employed managers are informed (higher ￿I), the higher is the probability that prices are
fully revealing. When there is full revelation, uninformed managers are better o⁄ because
they are never ￿red and their expected utility is higher. Together with the dynamics of ￿I,
this implies that W
￿
q;￿I￿
keeps decreasing whenever the default risk remains qH and keeps
increasing whenever the default risk remains qL.




























Panel C: Premium Ratio
time
P/P*
Figure 4: Panel A compare the evolution of ￿I and ￿I￿ over time for a speci￿c sequence of
shocks. Panel B compares the evolution of ￿ and ￿￿ for the same simulation. Panel C plots
the ratio of ￿=￿￿. The parameters used are: MI = :5, ￿ = 2, ￿ = :99, ￿ = :85, ! = :5,
￿ = :1, b ￿ b = :71, q = :3, q = :9, ￿L = :1, and ￿H = :9.




equation (24), the fact that W
￿
q;￿I￿
is increasing in ￿I immediately translates in ￿
￿
q;￿I￿
31being increasing ￿I. Moreover, there are two e⁄ects of q on the premium. On the one hand,
there is a direct positive e⁄ect of q on ￿
￿
q;￿I￿
, that is, the higher is the default risk the
higher is the ￿ring probability and hence the reputational premium. On the other hand,
there is the positive e⁄ect of q on W
￿
q;￿I￿
, that increases the premium in the high default
risk state and decreases the absolute size of the discount in the low default risk state.
Panel B in Figure 4 compares the simulated pattern of the premium for a realized sequence
of default risk for the baseline model with iid q and the persistent model. Panel C in the same
￿gure plots the ratio ￿=￿￿ so that the comparison is more evident. First, it is interesting to
notice that the persistence of q magni￿es the reputational premium when positive (q = qH)
and dampens it when negative (q = qL). This comes from the direct e⁄ect of q on W
￿
q;￿I￿
and from the fact that ￿I increases (decreases) whenever q = qL (qH), driving W
￿
q;￿I￿
and hence the absolute value of the premium up (down). Second, it is striking that the
premium varies over time even for a sequence of realizations where the default risk does not
change. For example, if the default risk stays equal to qL for a sequence of periods, ￿I keeps
increasing and so does the expected utility W
￿
qL;￿I￿
. This implies that the reputational
discount increases in absolute value, even though the default probability does not change.
In contrast, if the economy experiences a sequence of high realizations of default risk qH, ￿I
decreases, hence reducing W
￿
qL;￿I￿
and dampening the reputational premium.
To sum up, when the default risk is persistent, there is an additional source of volatility
in asset price dynamics, driven by the labor market. In this example, the bond price can vary
even when the fundamentals of the risky bond do not change. In particular, the measure of
employed informed agents changes the future informational content of prices, which changes
career prospects of uninformed managers, which, in turn, a⁄ect current prices. Moreover,
we show that the degree of persistency magni￿es the ampli￿cation e⁄ect in states with high
default probability and dampens it when the default risk is low.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a general equilibrium model of delegated portfolio manage-
ment with time-varying default risk, where career concerns distort asset prices. In particular,
risky bonds trade with a reputational premium, which may be positive or negative depend-
ing on the default risk. For example, when the default probability is high, the return on
the risky bond has to be high to compensate the uninformed managers for the high risk of
being ￿red. As the default risk changes over time, the reputational premium ampli￿es the
volatility of the risky bond price.
For future research, it would be interesting to introduce alternative risky assets in the
32portfolio choice of the managers. In this case, our mechanism would generate contagion.
Imagine that there are two risky bonds and a riskless asset. The reputational cost of investing
in the risk-less asset depends on the default probability of both the risky bonds. If none of
them defaults, the manager who invests in the risk-less asset loses his reputation. Thus, if
the probability of default of any of the risky bonds decreases, the risk-less asset will be less
attractive, and the prices of both bonds will have to increase in order to make uninformed
managers indi⁄erent between di⁄erent investment opportunities.
Finally, it would be interesting to develop the supply side of the model in the context of
sovereign debt.18 A large literature on business cycle characteristics of emerging markets 19
highlights that emerging market bond spreads are very volatile. In particular, the magnitude
of volatility of interest rates is hard to reconcile with models where bond prices are deter-
mined by the standard no-arbitrage condition. Our model provides an appealing framework
to think about this excess volatility.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Here we complete the proof that, under assumptions A1-A3, there exists a stationary equi-
librium with the features described in Proposition 1. The main part of the proof is in
the text, but we need three additional steps: ￿rst, we show that the allocation probability
X (f0;1g;q;￿;b) is independent of ￿, conditional on q and p = ~ P (q); second, we derive the
equilibrium values for ￿I, ￿U, and ￿ that are consistent with stationary labor market ￿ ows
and managers￿free entry; third, we complete the proof that the investors￿￿ring strategy
is optimal, by showing that assumption A2 is su¢ cient to ensure that the belief that an
employed manager is informed if he did not reveal to be uninformed is always higher than
the probability that a newly hired manager is informed.
Step 1. First, we want to show that the allocation probability X (f0;1g;q;￿;b) is
independent of ￿, conditional on q and p = ~ P (q), that is,
E
h




X (f0;1g;q;￿;b)jq;￿ = 0;p = ~ P (q)
i
:
From the equilibrium price schedule (7), we know that p = ~ P (q) if z 2 [b;b￿￿I]. Assumption
18Guerrieri and Kondor (2009) proposes a ￿rst attempt in this direction.
19See Neumeyer and Perri (2005), Uribe and Yue (2006), Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), and Arellano
(2008).
33A1 ensures that this happens with positive probability. Recall that z = b￿(1 ￿ ￿)￿I. Hence,
when p = ~ P (q) and ￿ = 1 it must be that b 2 [b;b￿￿I], while when p = ~ P (q) and ￿ = 0 it
must be that b 2 [b + ￿I;b]. One can then derive
E
h






￿U dF (b) =
1












￿U dF (b) =
1




It follows that these two expressions are the same, completing the proof.
Step 2. The ￿ring probabilities consistent with the equilibrium ￿ring strategy according
to ￿
s
t = E [￿(￿i;t;￿i;t;￿t;pt)jxs
t] can be reduced to ￿
I















if zt 2 [b;b ￿ ￿I]








1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
: (27)











































Notice that lim￿!0 g (￿) = 1, lim￿!1 g (￿) < 0 thanks to the assumption that ￿ < ￿R, and
g0 (￿) < 0 by inspection. It immediately follows that there exists a unique ￿ 2 (0;1) such
that g (￿) = 0. Given ￿, one can use equation (27) to solve for a unique ￿I < MI, and hence
34a unique ￿U = ￿ ￿ ￿I, and equation (28) to solve for a unique W.








that is, the probability that a newly hired manager is informed is equal to the ratio of
unemployed informed managers relative to all the unemployed managers. When manager
i realizes ￿i;t = 1 ￿ ￿t and/or pt 2 f0;1=Rg, the investor￿ s belief is updated according






(1 ￿ ￿i;t)], where ￿
U
t de￿ned in equation (26) denotes the
proportion of uninformed managers who are ￿red. Next, we show that assumption A2 is
su¢ cient to make sure that in equilibrium ￿i;t+1 ￿ "t for any ￿
U
t and ￿i;t+1 > 0.
First, consider an investor who has just hired manager i at the end of t ￿ 1 and hence,
by de￿nition, has prior belief ￿i;t = "t￿1. In this case, if ￿i;t = 1 ￿ ￿t and/or pt 2 f0;1=Rg,










. Next, we want to show that ￿i;t+1 ￿ "t. This













Using expression (31) for "t with NI





, and, hence, condition (32) can be rewritten as NU
t =NU































, which is ensured by assumption A2, given
that ￿
U
t 2 [1 ￿ !;1] for all t.
Let us now consider managers who were working for an investor for longer than 1 period.
First, notice that the investors￿beliefs about any manager who is still working at time t but
was hired at time t0 < t must be higher than the initial belief "t0￿1, given that if he was not
￿red he never made any mistake, that is, ￿i;t ￿ "t0￿1. Hence, the posterior belief about a


























(1 ￿ "t0)="t0, which, by the same argument, is satis￿ed when assumption A2 holds,
completing the proof.
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￿logR if z(￿;b) 2 [b ￿ ￿I;b)
log ~ P (q) if z(￿;b) 2 [b;b ￿ ￿I]
log0 if z(￿;b) 2 (b ￿ ￿I;b]
;
where combining (10) and expression (11) to substitute for W, we obtain




1 ￿ [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)E (q)]￿!￿
1 ￿ [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)E (q)]￿!￿ ￿ (1 ￿ 2q)￿!￿
￿
;
where ￿ = ￿I=(b ￿ b). Recall that Assumption A3 ensures that ~ P (q) 2 (0;1=R) for any
q 2 [q;q]. Taking logs of this expression and of equation (12) we can de￿ne
h(q) ￿ logP
B (q) = log(1 ￿ q) ￿ logR;
g (q) ￿ log ~ P (q) = log(1 ￿ q) ￿ logR ￿ log
￿
1 ￿ [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)E (q)]￿!￿
1 ￿ [￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)E (q)]￿!￿ ￿ (1 ￿ 2q)￿!￿
￿
:
Next, di⁄erentiate the last two expressions with respect to q and obtain h0 (q) = ￿1=(1 ￿ q)
and g0 (q) = ￿1=(1 ￿ q) ￿ 2￿￿!=[1 ￿ ￿￿! (1 ￿ 2q + ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)E (q))]. Assumptions A1
and A3 guarantee that jg0 (q)j > jh0 (q)j. De￿ne ￿ h ￿
R
h(q)dF (q), ￿ g ￿
R
g (q)dF (q), and
q0 such that g (q0) =
R
g (q)dF (q). Then
V ar(g (q)) =
Z
(g (q) ￿ ￿ g)
2 dF (q) =
Z
(g (q) ￿ g (q0))




where the last inequality follows from jg0 (q)j > jh0 (q)j and the monotonicity of both h and
g. Moreover, from a standard property of the second moment, we can write
Z
(h(q) ￿ h(q0))
2 dF (q) =
Z ￿
h(q) ￿ ￿ h
￿2 dF (q) +
Z ￿￿ h ￿ h(q0)
￿2 dF (q):
Combining the last two expressions we then obtain
V ar(g (q)) >
Z ￿
h(q) ￿ ￿ h
￿2 dF (q) +
Z ￿￿ h ￿ h(q0)
￿2 dF (q) ￿ V ar(h(q)):




whenever z (￿;b) 2 [b;b ￿ ￿I].
For any other z (￿;b) = 2 [b;b ￿ ￿I], logP (q;￿;b) = logP B (q), completing the proof that





36Proof of Proposition 3
From the proof of Proposition 2, it is straightforward that the ampli￿cation e⁄ect is going
to be stronger, the higher is the absolute value of dlog ~ P (q)=dq, or jg0 (q)j in the notation
of the proof. Such an object is larger, the larger is y (q;￿), where








￿ (1 ￿ E (q)) + E (q)
!#￿1
;
where with some slight abuse of notation I de￿ne by ￿I (￿) the equilibrium measure of
informed employed managers as a function of the parameter ￿. Recall that Assumption
A3 is su¢ cient to ensure that y (q;x) > 0 for all q 2 [q;q]. We can then di⁄erentiate this




















￿ (1 ￿ E (q)) + E (q)
!#￿2
> 0:






[1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
2 > 0:
Moreover, we can ￿nd ￿0 (￿) applying the implicit function theorem to (30), where, with


































































which gives ￿0 (￿) = ￿g￿=g￿ > 0;so that d￿I=d￿ > 0. This implies dy (q;￿)=d￿ > 0,
completing the proof.
37Proof of Proposition 5
Most of the arguments used in the existence proof for q iid case go through for q persistent.







satisfying equations (19), (20), and (22), we only need to prove that the investors￿￿ring
strategy is optimal. That is, we show that assumption A2￿is su¢ cient to ensure that the
belief that an employed manager is informed if he did not reveal to be uninformed is always
higher than the probability that a newly hired manager is informed.
More precisely, we now show that under A2￿ , the posterior probability that manager i is
informed if ￿i;t = 1￿￿t is larger than the probability that an unemployed manager at time t
is informed, "t. The proof follows closely the one for the iid case. First, consider an investor
who has just hired manager i so that his prior belief ￿i;t = "t. In this case, if ￿i;t = 1 ￿ ￿t,










. Next, we want to show that ￿i;t+1 ￿ "t. This
























































, a su¢ cient condition is then
! ￿
￿



































(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿!￿);
which ensures that A2￿is su¢ cient for condition (33) to be satis￿ed. A similar argument to
the iid case applies when managers have been employed for more than 1 period, completing
the proof.
20We use the weaker condition (34) instead of A2￿when we pick parameters for our numerical example.
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